by R. Sasankan
When US President Donald Trump started to weaponize tariffs as part of a
grand design to reignite the engines of American growth in the belief
that he could claw back manufacturing jobs from China, there were many
who questioned the need for the tariff tantrum and the ability to
enforce these levies in a modern global economy.
But Trump has not been the first US president to go down this road.
America's tryst with tariffs dates back to 1789 when George Washington
signed the Tariff of 1789 which was explicitly designed to restrict
British imports and build young America's manufacturing sectors.
President William McKinley championed the McKinley Tariff of 1890, using
high rates aggressively to protect domestic manufacturing wages from
foreign competition.
Another President, Herbert Hoover, signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in
1930, raising import duties to record levels to shield American
businesses during the Great Depression. This backfired when foreign
countries retaliated with their own tariffs, hastening the global
economic collapse.
Historically, tariffs served as America's main source of government
revenue and a tool for economic leverage long before the modern income
tax era. President Richard Nixon imposed a temporary 10% global import
surcharge not strictly for long-term protectionism, but as a blunt-force
threat to force foreign allies and rivals (like Japan and European
nations) to revalue their currencies and renegotiate global monetary
rules.
Still, Donald Trump is a lot different from his predecessors both as a
person and as US president. Trumpian tariff threats break from past US
history by shifting from narrow economic or revenue tools into blunt,
universal instruments of geopolitical coercion. While historical tariffs
aimed to protect specific domestic industries or raise federal revenue,
Trump uses broad baseline threats against friends and foes alike to
force non-trade concessions.
Trump administration's "America First" and reciprocal trade policies,
hit a peak in mid-2025 when the US imposed a cumulative 50% tariff on
Indian goods. This rate was later reduced to 18% in February 2026
following interim trade talks
The Trump administration's latest provocations and tariff threats centre
on a White House report titled "The Great Transshipment Scam," which
accuses India-along with over 40 other nations-of serving as a shadow
corridor by allowing Chinese exporters to route goods and evade US
tariffs. The White House explicitly named India as a Tier 1 trans
-shipment risk, alleging that manufacturing hubs are being used to
repackage, lightly assemble, or re-label Chinese goods to mask their
true origin.
Top US officials and proposed legislation (such as the Sanctioning
Russia and Iran Act) have leveraged the threat of duties scaling up to
100% or higher over India's continued refusal to halt oil imports from
Russia.
Is India's import of Russian crude the real issue or is Trump using it
as a weapon to hobble India's fast-growing economy? Russia supplies
nearly half of India's total crude imports. Trump and his advisers know
that it will not be easy for India to prune price-discounted Russian
crude. Cutting Russian imports by half would increase India's annual oil
import bill by $5 billion to $10 billion. It would also raise domestic
inflation, weaken the rupee, and expand the current account deficit.
What happens if Trump carries out his threat of 100% tariff? I posed
this question to a few experts who say a 100% duty would double the cost
of Indian goods in the US. This would affect sectors like IT, textiles,
pharmaceuticals, and engineering products making them uncompetitive
compared to alternative global suppliers.
Public opinion polls show that Donald Trump's approval ratings have
tumbled to a record low. Some specific surveys report that his net
approval ratings have dropped into negative territory - the recent
Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that only 33% approved of his performance while
64% disapproved - while others reveal that 40% of the respondents have
labelled him as the worst in US history. Historians generally rank
19th-century figures like James Buchanan and Andrew Johnson at the very
bottom in terms of approvals.
India need not get excited over his reported unpopularity. Nor should it
bother about the claim that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump are
good friends. Personal warmth cannot override Washington's broader
strategic sanctions goals. Trump views trade through an "America First"
lens, openly accusing India of taking advantage of the U.S. with high
historic tariffs.
No one knows what Trump may or may not do. I suspect he does not know
which way he will eventually go. The lunges, feints and dramatic
turnarounds may be part of a strategy but it has gone on for so long
that one must look askance at the coherence of the plan. The Trump
Administration is simultaneously working on sanctioning 40 countries for
transhipping Chinese goods. India, Canada and Mexico are part of the
40. To counter the tariff threat, India certainly can pursue strategic
trade negotiations, diversify global export markets, and strategically
balance its domestic agricultural and energy baselines. These are normal
options.
My personal hope -- and belief -- is that India will not buckle at the prospect of 100% tariffs!
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